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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH KOREAN PRODUCT LIABILITY 
INCLUDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA 
As South Korean Product Liability Act was revised to adopt the U.S. doctrine of 
punitive damages, there is a theoretical necessity of reviewing the relations between the 
theory of product liability and the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages. The theory of 
product liability is closely related to the strict liability but the doctrine of punitive 
damages has been developed to regulate malicious misconducts. Due to the different 
basic concepts, the strict liability and malicious misconducts, the theory of product 
liability might not include the doctrine of punitive damages. In addition to the 
compatibility issue, functions of the punitive damages are another issue. Although the 
punitive damages are regarded not as a criminal issue, but as torts, the punitive damages 
function as punishment, deterrence, retribution, and so on. With the issues about 
compatibility and functions, this thesis suggests two implications for improving the 
revised South Korean Product Liability Act. The first implication for the revised South 
Korean Product Liability Act is that implementing the punitive damages of South Korea 
within the three times of compensatory damages regardless of the degree of malicious 
misconducts is not fit for regulating various types of malicious misconducts. Therefore, 
there is a necessity for reforming the three–time’s cap of South Korean punitive damages. 
The second is that South Korean manufacturers have a responsibility to consider their 
products’ safety. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the South Korean legal system, even though the U.S. doctrine of punitive 
damages was enacted as a special rule in the several special acts,1 there was a dispute 
over whether the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages could be introduced into South 
Korean Product Liability Act.2 After policymakers of South Korea considered the U.S. 
doctrine and its pros and cons, the doctrine was introduced into the revised South Korean 
Product Liability Act.3 Before the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was enacted in the 
revised South Korean Product Liability Act, the ex–Act4 could not regulate 
                                   
1 Hadogeubgeorae Gongjeonghwae Kwanhan Beobryul [Fair Transaction in Subcontracting Act], Act No. 
3779, Dec. 31, 1984, partially amended by Act No. 14143, Mar. 29, 2016, art. 25–3 (S. Kor.); 
Gaeinjeongbo Bohobeob [Personal Information Protection Act], Act No. 10465, Mar. 29, 2011, partially 
amended by Act No. 14107, Mar. 29, 2016, art 39 (S. Kor.); Daerijeomgeoraeui Gongjeonghwae Gwanhan 
Beobryul [Fair Agency Transaction Act], Act No. 13614, Dec. 22, 2015, new enactment, art. 34 (S. Kor.); 
Sinyongjeongboui Iyong Mit Bohoe Gwanhan Beobryul [Credit Information Use and Protection Act], Act 
No. 4866, Jan. 5, 1995, partially amended by Act No. 14823, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 43 (S. Kor.); 
Jeongbotongsinmang Iyongchokjin Mit Jeongboboho Deunge Gwanhan Beobryul [Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc.], Act No. 3848, 
May. 12, 1986, partially amended by Act No. 14080, Mar. 22, 2016, art. 32 (S. Kor.); Giganje Mit 
Dansigangeulloja Boho Deunge Gwanhan Beobryul [Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed–Term and Part–
Time Workers], Act No. 8074, Dec. 21, 2006, partially amended by Act No. 12469, Mar. 18, 2014, art. 13 
(S. Kor.). 
2 See e.g., Yong–Seok Yoon, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange Kwanhan Mikookeu Choikeun Donghyang 
[Punitive Damages in USA torts system], Jaesanbeobyeongoo Je23Kwon Je1Ho [PROP. L. REV. vol. 23–1] 
247, 270–72 (2006) (S. Kor.); Se–il Ko, Daeryukbeobeseo Jinbeoljeok Sonhaebaesang Noneu [Discussions 
of Punitive Damages in the Civil Law Countries – A perspective of Civil Law –], Beobjo Je688Ho [LAW. 
ASS’N J. vol. 688] 142, 180–83 (2014) (S. Kor.); Tae–Sun Kim, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangjaedoe 
Daehan Gochal – Minbeobgaejeonge Ddareun Doipnoneuwa Gwanryeonhayeo [A Study on Punitive 
Damages: Introducing punitive damages into Korean Law], Minsabeobhak Je50Kwon [KOR. J. CIVIL L. 
vol. 50] 235, 268–70 (2010) (S. Kor.). But see e.g., Seok–Chan Yoon, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange 
Kwanhan Sogo; Dokilbeobchegyeoeu Kwanjeomeseo [The Liability of Punitive Damages; based on the 
German Legal System], Jaesanbeobyeongoo Je29Kwon Je4Ho [PROP. L. REV. vol. 29–4] 141, 152–53 
(2013) (S. Kor.); Jong–Goo Lee 1, Mikookeseoui Volkswagenui Jadongcha Baegigas Sagisosongkwa 
Sisajeom [Vol[k]swagen’s Diesel Emission Cheating Litigation in the U.S. and its Impolication], Hankook 
Kieup beobhakhoe Je30Kwon Je3Ho [BUS. L. REV. vol. 30–3] 271, 294–95 (2016) (S. Kor.); Jae–Ok 
Chang & Eun–Ok Lee, Jingbeiljeok Sonhaebaesang Gaenyeomeu Sooyoungganeungseong [Acceptability 
of Concept of Punitive Damages], Beobhaknonmoonjip Je39Jip Je3Ho [CHUNG–ANG J. LEGAL STUD. vol. 
39–3] 81, 109–10 (S. Kor.). 
3 Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], Act No. 6109, Jan. 12, 2000, amended by Act. No. 
14764, Apr. 18, 2017 (S. Kor.). 
4 Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], Act No. 6109, Jan. 12, 2000, amended by Act. No. 
11813, May. 22, 2013 (S. Kor.). 
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manufacturers’ outrageous or malicious misconducts properly. For example, when a 
manufacturer maliciously causes consumers to get injured, the manufacturer just provides 
injured consumers with compensatory damages.5 Considering the result of the example, 
the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages could be expected as a proper regulation for 
protecting South Korean consumers in product liability actions. 
As the doctrine of punitive damages is enacted in the revised Product Liability 
Act,6 the apparent legal purpose of regulating malicious manufacturers’ wrongdoing will 
be solved by the revised Act. However, there is a legal question regarding whether the 
revised Product Liability Act might protect right of a consumer because the adopted 
punitive damages award into the revised Act is restricted to three times of compensatory 
damages. Compared with the U.S. punitive damages, South Korean punitive damages 
might be less effective than the U.S. ones. The restricted punitive damages of South 
Korea could not function as the original meaning of the U.S. punitive damages. The 
restricted punitive damages award has a less influence on outrageous or malicious 
wrongdoing. Due to the possibility of a huge amount of punitive damages awards, the 
punitive damages could become effective. 
Before the revised Product Liability Act is enforced, there is necessary of 
reviewing the revised Act with the U.S. dispute over product liability including punitive 
damages to improve effectiveness of South Korean punitive damages in the revised Act 
for protecting right of a consumer. With the perspective of comparative law, there are two 
main categories about punitive damages between the United States and South Korea. The 
                                   
5 Id.; Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act. No. 13125, Feb. 3, 2015, art. 750, 
art. 393, 750, and 763. (S. Kor.). 
6 Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, art. 3 (art. 3 and art. 3–2 were amended in 
Apr. 18, 2017 and the Act will be enforced in Apr. 19, 2018). 
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first category is compatibility between product liability and punitive damages. The 
second is applicability of punitive damages to product liability. After that studying the 
relation between effectiveness of South Korean punitive damages and restriction of the 
punitive damages award is for improving right of a consumer. 
Considering the revised South Korean Product Liability Act and its influence, 
there are several legal issues in detail: (1) While the doctrine of punitive damages has 
been developed by the U.S. common law legal system, South Korean Civil Act is 
established not by the common law, but by the continental law system; (2) When the U.S. 
courts assess an award of punitive damages against a wrongdoer, the wrongdoer could 
possibly become bankruptcy because of a huge amount of punitive damages. Therefore, 
establishing the optimal level of punitive damages is needed for achieving the purpose of 
punitive damages; (3) Since product liability actions are generally related to the theory of 
strict liability, the doctrine which regards wrongdoer’s subjective intention as an 
important factor for imposing punitive damages on him or her would not be mingled with 
the product liability. Furthermore, there is a dispute over whether the imposition of 
punitive damages could be regarded as an object of warranty action in product liability 
litigation because the doctrine is familiar with torts rather than contracts; (4) Since the 
doctrine of punitive damages has several functions such as punishment, deterrence, law 
enforcement, and compensation, considering the influence of these functions on product 
liability litigation in South Korea is also necessary; and (5) reviewing the U.S. standard 
for product liability including punitive damages by comparative analysis of law helps the 
revised Act to improve effectiveness of punitive damages for protecting right of a 
consumer as well as to regulate malicious manufacturers effectively. 
 4 
II. INTRODUCTION OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES INTO SOUTH KOREA 
A. U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES  
i. ORIGIN OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages, which are called as exemplary damages or vindictive damages, 
or “smart money”, are thought to have originated in the English common law legal 
system for regulating outrageous misconducts that government officers commit by 
abusing their authority.7 The doctrine of punitive damages in the English common law 
legal system was articulated by the English courts.8 In 1760’s aggravating cases, the 
court awarded punitive damages, which were determined by juries, to those who caused 
outrageous misconducts.9 At that time, the punitive damages formulated by the English 
courts played a role as compensating for plaintiffs’ intangible damages and as punishing 
defendants’ outrageous misconducts because the concept of actual damages did not cover 
intangible damages.10 However, throughout the 19th century, since the attitude of the 
English and the U.S. courts over punitive damages had gradually begun to regard 
intangible damages as actual damages, after all punitive damages did not play a role as 
compensation for intangible damages anymore.11 
In 1784, the U.S. court firstly mentioned punitive damages in the case about the 
                                   
7 Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, & DAVID F. 
PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 572 (13th ed. 2015); David 
G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1263 (1975); Michael 
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort 
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1290–1291 (1993). 
8 Id. 
9 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 519 (1957); SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & 
PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 572; Owen, supra note 7, at 1262, 1263. 
10 Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 519. 
11 Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 520; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 
801 (1948); Motor Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 274 (1943). 
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defendant’s practical joke12 and in 1851, Supreme Court of the U.S. accepted the 
doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of law.13 When punitive damages were adopted 
into the U.S. legal system, an emphasized role of punitive damages was mainly to 
compensate for defendants’ mental anguish, personal indignity, and disgrace.14 This is 
because, at that time, intangible damages were not included in actual damages.15 With 
the double purposes of punitive damages, compensation and punishment, the early U.S. 
punitive damages was developed. Due to the double purposes of punitive damages, there 
were debates over the validity of the doctrine between the legal formalism and the legal 
realism.16 The legal formulism, which sharply distinguished between civil and criminal 
process, thought of punitive damages as a usurpation of the functions of the criminal 
law.17 This is because the legal formulism thought that the imposition of punitive 
damages by civil process was regarded as a violation of the separation between civil and 
criminal process.18 Another reason why the legal formulism denied punitive damages in 
the U.S. common law legal system was that admitting punitive damages in the civil 
process could violate the rights guaranteed by criminal process.19 
Even though the legal formulism logically denied punitive damages as a matter of 
                                   
12 Owen, supra note 7, at 1262; Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6, 7 (C.P. and Gen. Sess. 1784). 
13 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851); Owen, supra note 7, at 1263. 
14 Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 519; Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the 
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12–20 (1982); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1290–92 
(1993); Fay v. Parker 53 N.H. 342, 380–381 (1872). 
15 Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 519, 520. 
16 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1298; Owen, supra note 7, at 1263; SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 246 n.2 (16th ed. 1899); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES ch.16 (9th ed. 1912). 
17 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1298–1299; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1982); Owen, supra note 7, at 1264; Fay v. Parker supra note 
14, at 382, 397. 
18 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1298–1299; GREENLEAF, supra note 16, at § 253, at 240 n.2; Horwitz, 
supra note 17, at 1425. 
19 Horwitz, supra note 17, at 1425; Owen, supra note 7, at 1264; Fay v. Parker supra note 14, at 382, 397. 
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law, those who agreed with adopting punitive damages into the U.S. common law legal 
system practically argued that punitive damages served as well–recognized social 
functions.20 Not only did the imposition of punitive damages provide plaintiffs hurt by 
outrageous misconducts with satisfaction, but it also had a positive influence on the 
community.21 This is because the imposition of punitive damages served as an example 
to the community for deterring them from committing a similar misconduct.22 
The debates over the validity of punitive damages between the legal formalism 
and the legal realism was reflected to judicial decisions.23 Even though a few states 
restricted the doctrine of punitive damages,24 most states confidently established the 
doctrine of punitive damages in the common law legal system.25 
 
ii. DEFINITION OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages are not awarded against the defendant for the plaintiffs’ harm 
suffered, but rather for punishing the defendant’s outrageous misconducts, for retribution, 
for admonishing the defendant not to let the misconducts happen again, and for deterring 
others like the defendant from analogous misconducts in the future.26 The imposition and 
                                   
20 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1300; SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at § 474, at 904. 
21 Owen, supra note 7, at 1263; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1301; SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at § 347, at 687. 
22 Id. 
23 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1301; Owen, supra note 7, at 1263. 
24 SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574 (explaining that Nebraska constitutionally 
prohibits punitive damages and that Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington allow the 
trier of fact to assess punitive damages against the defendant only if expressly authorized by statute.); 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1301; O’Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31F. Supp. 364, 364 (D. Mass. 
1940); Burton v. Levitt Stores Corp., 179 A. 185, 186 (N.H. 1935). 
25 Owen, supra note 7, at 1263–1264. 
26 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1) (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (reporting that “[p]unitive damages are 
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his 
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.”); BRYAN A. 
GARNER ET AL., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (5th pocket ed. 2016) (explaining that punitive damages 
are [d]amages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, 
or deceit; specif., damages assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others.”); 
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the determination of the amount of punitive damages are determined by the jury’s 
discretion with reflection to consider the character of the defendants’ misconducts, the 
nature and extent of the plaintiff’s damages caused by the defendant, and the wealth of 
the defendant.27 For example, under the settled rule prevailing in South Carolina, the 
jury’s discretion for the imposition and the determination of punitive damages is the duty 
as well as the right of the jury to assess punitive damages against the defendants.28 
To understand the doctrine of punitive damages, figuring out the purpose of 
compensatory and punitive damages as well as distinguishing between the characteristic 
of them are necessary. The U.S. judicial system distinguishes between compensatory and 
punitive damages, when the plaintiff is damaged by the defendants’ outrageous 
misconduct.29 The purpose of compensatory damages30 is to redress the actual damages 
caused by the defendants’ misconduct. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are designed 
to punish outrageous misconducts for retribution, to deter its similar conducts, and to 
compensate for the plaintiff’s excess actual damages.31 Since there are different purposes 
between compensatory and punitive damages, the courts separately decide the amount of 
                                   
SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 572; Owen, supra note 7, at 1265; Corbert McClellan, 
Exemplary Damages in Indiana, 10 IND. L. J. 275, 276 (1935); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 
492–93 (2008). 
27 Owen, supra note 7, at 1265–67; Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908, comment d, e; 
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30; Thomas v. Mickel, 214 Miss. 176, 
188 (1952). 
28 Owen, supra note 7, at 1265–67; Sample v. Gulf Ref. Co., 183 S.C. 399, 410 (1937). But see SCHWARTZ, 
KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 575; Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003). 
29 SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell. 538 
U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); BMW of N. 
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991). 
30 GARNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 209 (explaining that compensatory damages are “[d]amages sufficient 
in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered”). 
31 SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell., 
supra note 29, at 416; Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., supra note 29, at 432; BMW of N. 
Am. v. Gore, supra note 29, at 568; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra note 29, at 19. 
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compensatory and punitive damages.32  
With the purpose of punitive damages such as punishment, deterrence, and 
retribution, the doctrine of punitive damages mainly served as retribution for the 
defendants’ outrageous misconduct during the nineteenth century.33 When the defendant 
outrageously sold the defective products to the plaintiff with violating community norms, 
as the judges awarded punitive damages to the defendant, the imposition of punitive 
damages could achieve retribution for the outrageous misdeed.34 In addition to the 
retribution, the doctrine of punitive damages played a critical role in protecting 
consumers as the courts expanded the applicability of the doctrine during the early 
twentieth century.35 When the plaintiff was damaged by a merchant’s malice, fraud, 
insult, reckless, or wanton misconducts during the commercial transactions, the 
imposition of punitive damages regulated these merchant’s misconducts.36 
 
iii. OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
One of the critical disadvantages of the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages is an 
unexpected award. Due to the unexpected punitive damages award, decision–makers are 
                                   
32 Id. 
33 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1304; MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW 1870–1960 113 (1992). 
34 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1304; Greene v. Keithley, 86 F.2d 238, 242 (8th Cir. 1936); Luikart v. 
Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo. 1932); Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Dinsmore, 144 So. 21, 23 (Ala. 
1932); Saberton v. Greenwald, 66 N.E.2d 224, 229 (Ohio 1946); Lufty v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor Co., 
115 P.2d 161, 165 (Ariz. 1941); Jones v. West Side Buick Co., 93 S.W.2d 1083, 1099 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936); 
Hunt Battery Mfg. Co. v. Stovall, 80 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla. 1938); Hobbs v. Smith, 115 P. 347, 349 (Okla. 
1911). 
35 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1304. 
36 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1303; Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 170 S.W. 1062. 1064 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1914); Huffman v. Moore, 115 S.E. 634, 635 (S.C. 1923); State Mut. Life & Annuity Ass’n v. 
Baldwin, 43 S.E. 262, 264 (Ga. 1903); Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374, 376 (1876); Owen, supra note 7, at 
1265–1266. 
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worried about the imposition of punitive damages when they consider their company’s 
profits.37 Specifically compared with compensatory damages, the amount of punitive 
damages is far larger than them.38 The sum of punitive damages depends on the 
discretion of the jury, when the trier of fact assesses punitive damages against the 
defendant who causes outrageous misconducts.39 Due to the discretion of the jury, the 
problem is a proper scope of punitive damages. Since the jury’s feelings and sentiments 
have much more influence on the imposition of punitive damages than the award of 
compensatory damages, the discretion of the jury about the imposition of punitive 
damages is much wider and less credibility than the discretion of assessing compensatory 
damages.40  
In light of the huge amount of them, when the trier of fact assesses punitive 
damages against the wrongdoer, since the due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment hinders the U.S. states from assessing a grossly huge amount of punitive 
damages as a punishment against a wrongdoer, the judge has instructed the guideline 
                                   
37 Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 
WIS. L. REV. 237, 251, 284–86 (1998) (explaining if decision–makers outrageously or maliciously ignored 
results of their misconducts for their company’s profits and leaded to negative influence on the society, 
injured people could require the amount of punitive damages award of the malicious company, 
consequently, the doctrine of punitive damages has influence on behaviors of decision–makers who follow 
incentives); see Michael D. Murray, The Great Recession and The Rhetorical Canons of Law and 
Economics, 58 LOY. L. REV. 615, 640 (2012). 
38 SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 572–73; See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 
Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the jury’s verdict that the jury assessed $5,000 in 
compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages against the defendant); BMW of N. Am. v. 
Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997) (upholding the sum of $ 50,000 in punitive damages since Supreme 
Court of the U.S. regarded reduced punitive damages by the appellate court as the violation of due process 
rule and denied the appellate court decision that the awards of punitive damages should be reduced from 
$ 4,000,000 to $ 2,000,000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 415–16 
(reversing the judgement of Supreme Court of Utah which upheld the sum of $ 145,000,000 in punitive 
damages and $ 1,000,000 in compensatory damages). 
39 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908, comment d, e; Note, Exemplary Damages in the 
Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30; Thomas v. Mickel, supra note 27, at 188. 
40 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30; see Thomas v. Mickel, supra 
note 27, 188. But see SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at § 474, at 904. 
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suggested by Supreme Court of the U.S., which helps the jury to determine how much the 
amount of punitive damages is proper.41 The guideline consists of three standards: “(1) 
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the 
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) 
the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”42 Among the three standards, Supreme 
Court of the U.S. regards the first standard, the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s misconduct, as the most important standard for measuring the amount of 
punitive damages.43 The degree of reprehensibility of defendant’s misconduct is 
determined by five determinative factors: 
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious 
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety 
of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct 
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the 
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.44 
 With considering the five determinative factors, Supreme Court of the U.S. 
mentioned that “punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, 
after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition 
of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.”45 
                                   
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 418; 
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., supra note 29, at 440; BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, supra note 
29, at 574–75; Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908 (2); GARNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 211. 
42 Id. 
43 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 419; BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, supra note 
29, at 575–77.  
44 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 419. 
45 Id. 
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The second standard is the ratio between harm and punitive damages. In order to 
set the amount of punitive damages properly, the judge considers the “reasonable 
relationship” between actual and punitive damages and then the jury shall be instructed 
the disparity between compensatory damages and punitive damages.46 Although the 
jury’s feeling and sentiment for the imposition of punitive damages are regarded as the 
important element to achieve the purpose of punitive damages,47 the judge could modify 
the scope of punitive damages by his or her judicial experiences because the judge is well 
known about the average of the awards.48 When the judge modifies the amount of 
punitive damages assessed by the jury under the “reasonable relationship” rule, the judge 
declines to fix the mathematical ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.49 
This is because the standard of the fixed mathematical ratio, a bright–line ratio, cannot 
reflect all circumstances about the misconduct.50 
The disparity between the amount of punitive damages and the “civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases”51 is the third standard for measuring the 
                                   
46 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530. But see Developments in the Law – 
Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 938–39 (1956) (explaining that since the relation between the amount 
of actual and punitive damages focuses not on the admonitory function of tort law, but on the actual results, 
the “reasonable relationship” rule cannot achieve the purpose of punitive damages); Jonathan Kagan, 
Toward a Uniform Application of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for 
Punitive Damages Reform, 40 UCLA L. REV. 753, 757 (1993). 
47 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30 (As the trier of fact assesses 
punitive damages against the wrongdoer, the purpose of punitive damages such as punishment could be 
achieved effectively, and consequently community sentiment could be reflected by the imposition of 
punitive damages based on the jury’s feelings and sentiment); See text at note 82–86 infra. 
48 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530 (explaining that one of the functions 
of punitive damages, the admonitory function of tort law, could be better achieved by the judge than the 
jury). 
49 Id.; see e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 424–25. 
50 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530; Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance 
Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1943). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 
424–25 (mentioning that practically “…few awards exceeding a single–digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
51 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 428; BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, supra note 
29, at 575. 
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imposition of punitive damages properly.52 The meaning of the third standard is that if 
the imposition of punitive damages, which is processed by the civil procedural, is 
substituted for the criminal penalty, the wrongdoer’s constitutional right could be violated 
by the imposition of punitive damages.53 This is because the criminal procedure, 
compared with civil procedure, promises the heightened protections and the higher 
standards of proof for the guilty. Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages does 
not automatically serve as the method of regulating outrageous misconducts when there is 
a less possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on the wrongdoer.54 
The Model Punitive Damages Act hinders short of offering caps on punitive 
damages award with various controls on it.55 According to Section 7 of the Model 
Punitive Damages Act,56 when the juries shall be instructed by the court, they determine 
                                   
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See Unif. Law Comm’rs, The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Summary: Punitive 
Damages Act, Model (1996), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Punitive%20Damages%20Act,%20Model. 
56 Unif. Law Comm’rs’ Model Punitive Damages Act § 7 (approved by the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs 
on Unif. State Laws in July 18, 1996), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Punitive%20Damages%20Act,%20Model, 
(a) If a defendant is found liable for punitive damages, a fair and reasonable amount of 
damages may be awarded for the purposes stated in Section 5(a)(3). The court shall instruct the 
jury in determining what constitutes a fair and reasonable amount of punitive damages to 
consider any evidence that has been admitted regarding the following factors: 
(1) the nature of defendant’s wrongful conduct and its effect on the claimant and others; 
(2) the amount of compensatory damages; 
(3) any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid or to be paid by the defendant arising from 
the wrongful conduct; 
(4) the defendant’s present and future financial condition and the effect of an award on each 
condition; 
(5) any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant through the wrongful conduct, in excess of that 
likely to be divested by this and any other actions against the defendant for compensatory 
damages or restitution; 
(6) any adverse effect of the award on innocent persons; 
(7) any remedial measures taken or not taken by the defendant since the wrongful conduct; 
(8) compliance or noncompliance with any applicable standard promulgated by a governmental 
or other generally recognized agency or organization whose function it is to establish standards; 
and 
(9) any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the amount of the award. 
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a fair and reasonable amount of punitive damages. Among factors described in the 
Section 7 (a) of the Model Punitive Damages Act, the first three factors, Section 7 (a)(1), 
(2), and (3) are fundamentally identical with the three guidelines mentioned above.57 
There is a dispute over Section 7 (a)(4) of the Model Punitive Damages Act. Since each 
defendant has their own financial condition and the burden of punitive damages awards 
depends on the defendant’s financial condition, the court shall consider its financial 
condition for achieving the purpose of punitive damages such as punishment and 
deterrence.58 For example, if the trier of fact imposed punitive damages awards on the 
defendant regardless of his or her financial condition, a conglomerate would feel less 
burdensome than an ordinary corporation. Remaining factors, from Section 7 (a)(5) to 
(9), for punitive damages award, also help the juries to assess the amount of punitive 
damages against the defendant reasonably. 
In addition to the standard suggested by Supreme Court of the U.S. and the Model 
Punitive Damages Act, at the U.S. federal or state level, a total amount of punitive 
                                   
(b) If an award of punitive damages is authorized or governed by another statute of this State, 
any requirement as to amount or method of calculation established by that statute governs the 
award. 
(c) If the amount of punitive damages is decided by the court, the court upon motion of a party 
shall make findings showing the basis for the amount awarded against each defendant and enter 
its findings in the record. 
57 See id. § 7 (a) comment at 19. 
58 See text at supra note 27; Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 
927, 948 (2008). But see Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 269 (explaining that the statute of California, the 
U.S. restricts to consider the defendant’s financial condition to protect the defendant from the previous 
disclosure of his or her financial position); City of El Monte v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 4th 272, 276 
(1994); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (d) (West 2016): 
The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that 
defendant’s profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for 
plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or 
fraud in accordance with Section 3294. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be 
admissible only as to the defendant or defendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be 
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be 
presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and found one or more defendants 
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. 
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damages could be controlled by a cap or a ratio.59 When a trier of fact assesses a punitive 
damages award against a malicious wrongdoer within the restriction set by the caps or the 
ratio, the trier of fact considers several factors which are determined by a state statute or 
its case law.60 While these several factors for the imposition of punitive damages awards 
are similar with the standard of Supreme Court of the U.S. and the Model Punitive 
Damages Act, article 7 (a), setting the cap or the ratio for limiting punitive damages 
awards could weaken the deterrent effect because a liable manufacturer feels less burden 
on the limited imposition of punitive damages than on the unlimited the awards. Another 
method of controlling punitive damages awards is that a certain percentage of the awards 
is paid to the state governmental branch.61 Even though this method does not use the cap 
                                   
59 See Andrew F. Popper, Capping Incentive, Capping Innovation, Courting Disaster: The Gulf Oil Spill 
and Arbitrary Limits on Civil Liability, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 975, 978 (2011) (mentioning that both the U.S. 
states and federal government have restricted the amount of punitive damages by establishing caps on civil 
liability. While caps of the federal level normally serve as a cap on punitive damages caused by a specific 
activity or a particular industry, caps of the state level function as a cap on that except to medical 
malpractice); see e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE § 6–1603 (2010); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 60–1903 (2005); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.2 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25–9–411 (West 2015); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–42–02 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21–3–11 (2016); ALA. CODE § 6–11–21 
(LexisNexis 2014). See also e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6604(b)(1) (2012). 
60 See SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 589 Notes and Question n. 5; see e.g., Coats v. 
Construction & Gen. Laborers Local No. 185, 15 Cal.App.3d 908, 916 (1971) (stating that “the trier of fact 
can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff 
which the defendant caused or intended to cause, and the wealth of the defendant.”); Atlas Food Sys. and 
Svcs., Inc. v. Crane Nat. Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 593–94 (4th Cir.1996); Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So.2d 
291, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (2) (2015): 
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s misconduct; 
(b) The degree of the defendant’s awareness of that likelihood; 
(c) The profitability of the defendant’s misconduct; 
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it; 
(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct; 
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and 
(g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the defendant as a result of the 
misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations 
similar to the claimant’s and the severity of criminal penalties to which the defendant has been 
or may be subjected. 
61 SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 575–75; see e.g., Cheatham v. Pohle, supra note 28, at 
470; IND. CODE § 34–51–3–6 (2014): 
(a) Except as provided in IC 13–25–4–10, when a judgement that includes a punitive damages 
award is entered in a civil action, the party against whom the judgement was entered shall pay 
the punitive damage award to the clerk of the court where the action is pending. 
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or the ratio for restricting the amount of punitive damages awards, the optimal level of 
punitive damages awards could be achieved by paying a certain percentage of the award 
to the treasurer of state. 
 
B. SOUTH KOREAN DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
i. BACKGROUND 
The Seoul Eastern District Court in South Korea firstly mentioned the doctrine of 
punitive damages when the court dealt with an enforcement of a foreign judgement.62 At 
that time, the court did not approve the doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of the 
principle of South Korean Civil Act.63 This is because South Korean Civil Act did not 
regulate the doctrine of punitive damage and only codified limited compensatory 
damages in the torts part.64 After the case mentioned above, Supreme Court of South 
Korea still does not regard the doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of the Civil Act 
because of the same reasons suggested by the District Court.65 However, according to a 
survey conducted by the Seoul Bar Association of South Korea, of 1545 lawyers who 
participated in the survey, 1417 agreed to adopt the U.S. punitive damages into the South 
Korean legal system, even though there are different opinions about how to enact 
                                   
(b) Upon receiving the payment described in subsection (a), the clerk of the court shall: 
(1) pay the person to whom punitive damages were awarded twenty–five percent (25%) of 
the punitive damage award; and 
(2) pay the remaining seventy–five percent (75%) of the punitive damage award to the 
treasurer of state, who shall deposit the funds into the violent crime victims compensation 
fund established by IC 5–2–6.1–40. 
62 Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 247; Seoul Eastern District Court [Dist. Ct.], 93Ga–Hap1906, Feb. 10, 1995 
(S. Kor.). 
63 Seoul Eastern District Court [Dist. Ct.], supra note 62. 
64 Id.; Minbeob [Civil Act], supra note 5. 
65 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da207747, Jan. 28, 2016 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da1284, 
Oct. 15, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
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punitive damages.66 In light of the necessity of the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages, 
South Korean legislature enacted punitive damages into several special acts of South 
Korea in order to regulate malicious misconducts.67 
 
ii. NECESSITY OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES  
Since punitive damages was mentioned by the Seoul Eastern District Court of 
South Korea,68 the issue has been whether the doctrine of punitive damages should be 
introduced into the South Korean legal system. The opinions supporting the case of the 
Seoul Eastern District Court of South Korea are that there is no need to introduce 
punitive damages into the South Korean legal system.69 To be specific, since South 
Korean Civil Act is based on the continental law legal system, punishing and deterring 
malicious misconducts is expected not by the Civil Act, but by the Criminal Act, and thus 
the doctrine of punitive damages could not be adopted into the Civil Act.70 Furthermore, 
punitive damages could be substituted by consolation money which is codified in South 
Korean Civil Act, article 751 and 752.71  
In contrast, the doctrine of punitive damages should be adopted into the South 
                                   
66 Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangjaedo Doipe Byeonhosa 91.7% Chanseong [91.7% of Korean Lawyers 
Agree with Introduction of the Doctrine of Punitive Damages], Daehanbyeonhyeobsinmoon [News 
Koreanbar] (June 20, 2016), http://news.koreanbar.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=14789; Min–Jo 
Kim, Punitive damages may become a reality in Korea, About Korean Law (June. 15, 2016), 
http://www.aboutkoreanlaw.com/2016/06/punitive-damages-may-become-reality-in.html; Hyeon–Soo Son, 
Byeonhosa 10myeong Joong 9myeong, “Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesang Jaedo Doip Chanseong” [9 of 10 
lawyers, “Agree with Introduction of the Doctrine of Punitive Damages”], Beobryulsinmoon [Law Times] 
(June 15, 2016), https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?serial=101154. 
67 See text at supra note 1. 
68 Seoul Eastern District Court [Dist. Ct.], supra note 62. 
69 Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 271; Se–il, supra note 2, at 183; Tae–Sun, supra note 2, at 269. 
70 Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 249, 270; Se–il, supra note 2, at 181; Tae–Sun, supra note 2, at 246. 
71 Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 271–272; Se–il, supra note 2, at 182. 
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Korean legal system for preventing malicious conductors.72 There are four reasons. First, 
the scope of compensatory damages is limited.73 Even though consumers who severely 
injured by a manufacturer get compensatory damages, the amount of compensatory 
damages might not be enough to recover their damages because the compensatory 
damages are restricted by the defendant’s responsibility in the South Korean Civil 
system.74 Therefore, malicious wrongdoers have frequently made bad use of the 
limitation of compensatory damages.75 Second, the idea that punitive damages could be 
substituted by the consolation money is not proper to protect injured people because the 
scope of consolation money is also limited like compensatory damages.76 Third, if the 
doctrine of punitive damages is adopted into the South Korean legal system, the doctrine 
will play an important role in a class–action suit because it provides an injured person 
with a great motivation for filing a lawsuit against malicious conductors.77 Last, as the 
South Korean economic market has been influenced by the U.S. one, South Korean 
                                   
72 See SABEOBJAEDO GAEHYEOK CHOOJIN WIWONHOE [PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM], 
JINGBEOLJEOK BAESANGJAEDO CHANGOJARYO [THE DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LEAFLET] at 43, 63 
(2006); Jung–Hwan Yoon, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange Gwanhan Yeongoo [A Study on Punitive 
Damages], Minsabeobhak Je17Kwon [KOR. J. CIVIL L. vol. 17] 58, 87–88 (1999) (S. Kor.); Jeom–In Lee, 
Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangeu Doip Pilyoseonggwa Ganeungseunge Daehan Ilgochal [A Study on 
Necessity and Possibility on the Introduction of Punitive Damages], Dongabeobhak Je38Kwon [DONG–A 
L. REV. vol. 38] 187, 235–238 (2006) (S. Kor.); Sang–Chan Kim & Choong–Eun Lee, Jingbeoljeok 
Sonhaebaesangeu Doipel Wihan Bigyobeobjeok Gochal [Comparative Study for Introduction of the 
Punitive Damages System], Beobhakyeongoo Je35Kwon [L. REV. vol. 35] 163, 180 (2009) (S. Kor.); 
Deok–Hwan Lee, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange Gwanhan Ilgochal [A Study on the Punitive Damages], 
Beobhaknonchong Je24Kwon [L. REV. vol. 24–3] 563, 583 (2007) (S. Kor.); Seok–Chan, supra note 2, at 
155; Jong–Goo 1, supra note 2, at 295; Jae–Ok & Eun–Ok, supra note 2, at 110; Minsung Kim, 
Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesang Chaekimron [A Dispute of Liability for Punitive Damages], 49 (Feb. 2013) 
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Pusan National University) (on file with Jangjeon-Campus the First Library, 
Pusan National Library). 
73 Sung–Chun Kim, Jinbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangjedowa Sobijapihaegooje [Punitive Damages and 
Consumer Redress], in HANKOOKSOBIJAWON JEONGCHAKYEONGOOBOGOSEO 354–55 [in KOREAN 
CONSUMER AGENCY POLITICAL RESEARCH REPORT 347] (2003). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Jung–Hwan, supra note 72, at 86–87. 
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corporation laws have been continuously modified to regulate transactions and 
corporations.78 On the contrary, without improving regulations for protecting consumers, 
South Korean regulations on the economic market is likely to be unfair for South Korean 
consumers. For example, under the same business, when defective products cause 
consumers to get hurt, the U.S. consumers’ damages could be recovered by punitive 
damages as well as compensatory damages, but South Korean consumers damaged by the 
same manufacturer could be compensated by only compensatory damages. Considering 
this example, the result is unfair for South Korean consumers. Therefore, introducing the 
U.S. doctrine of punitive damages into South Korean legal system is reasonable for 
protecting South Korean consumers. 
 
iii. HOW TO APPLY THE U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO SOUTH KOREA 
As the doctrine of punitive damages was adopted into the South Korean legal 
system to regulate modern torts effectively, another issue is how to apply the doctrine of 
punitive damages to the South Korean legal system. To be specific, the issue is whether 
South Korean Civil Act could include the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages as a matter 
of law. If not, South Korean policymakers might consider which special acts need to 
adopt the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages to regulate malicious misconducts. 
The first method is that South Korean Civil Act should be revised to directly 
introduce the doctrine of punitive damages into the Civil Act.79 This is because South 
                                   
78 SABEOBJAEDO GAEHYEOK CHOOJIN WIWONHOE [PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM], 
supra note 72, at 61–62. 
79 Jung–Hwan, supra note 72, at 87–88; Jeom–In, supra note 72, at 235–238; Sang–Chan & Choong–Eun, 
supra note 72, at 180; Deok–Hwan, supra note 72, at 583. 
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Korean Civil Act codified limited compensatory damages.80 The second method is that 
South Korean legislature refers to the U.S. Model of Punitive Damages Act and 
independently enacts Punitive Damages Act which is distinguished from the Civil Act.81 
If South Korean legislature enacts the Punitive Damages Act, the Act will be able to 
regulate malicious misconducts effectively.82 This means that Punitive Damages Act can 
include various types of liabilities caused by malicious misconducts and can codify 
exceptions against general rules of the Civil Act.83 The third method is that adopting 
punitive damages not into the Civil Act, but into each special act is imperative of 
regulating malicious misconducts.84 Considering these three methods, the method of 
introducing punitive damages into each special act is much more reasonable than other 
methods. The South Korean legal system could be divided into two parts, a general act 
and each special act. Each special act serves as an act that regulates touch legal issues 
toward social problems and codifies exceptions against the principles of the general act. 
 
III. EXTENDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY 
A. PRODUCT LIABILITY INCLUDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
i. STANDARD OF PRODUCT LIABILITY INCLUDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The standard of product liability including punitive damages should be 
established with the flexible definition of malicious misconducts and the adequate 
                                   
80 Minbeob [Civil Act], supra note 5. 
81 See text at supra note 55–56. SABEOBJAEDO GAEHYEOK CHOOJIN WIWONHOE [PRESIDENTIAL 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM], Jingbeoljeok Baesangjaedo Changojaryo, supra note 72, at 43, 63. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Seok–Chan, supra note 2, at 155; Jong–Goo 1, supra note 2, at 295; Jae–Ok & Eun–Ok, supra note 2, at 
110; Minsung Kim, supra note 72, at 38–49. 
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notice for hindering manufacturers from marketing defective products because of the 
different degree of the manufacturer’s responsibility and because of the doctrine’s 
quasi–criminal character.85 With the imposition of punitive damages in product 
liability actions, the degree of responsibility depends on a manufacturer’s a conscious 
and reckless indifference to consumers’ safety related to their dangerous products.86 
Additionally, adequate notice by the standard could play an essential role in preventing 
manufacturers from marketing ultra–hazardous products because the notice warns 
against the marketing of this products with a high possibility of imposing punitive 
damages on wrongdoers.87 
With judicial experiences, the vague standard of product liability including 
punitive damages could be refined and developed.88 This standard is articulated by an 
examination of the recurring forms of manufacturers’ wrongdoing, and consequently 
the examination about manufacturers’ misconducts could be categorized into five types 
of misconducts:  
(1) Fraudulent–type misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety standards; (3) 
inadequate testing and manufacturing procedures; (4) failures to warn of known 
dangers before marketing; and (5) post–marketing failures to remedy know 
dangers.89 
In addition to the categorized misconducts, manufacturers grossly intend to 
                                   
85 Owen, supra note 7, at 1326. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1326–28, n.333–34 (mentioning various types of reported and unreported cases as well as 
additional information gathered on reported cases to articulate and to develop the standard of product 
liability including punitive damages). 
89 Id. at 1326–29. 
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abuse their position: 
(1) by failing to acquire sufficient product safety information through tests, 
inspections or post–marketing safety monitoring; (2) by failing to remedy an 
excessively dangerous condition known to exist in a product by altering its 
design, adding warnings or instructions, or recalling the product for repair; or 
(3) by knowingly misleading the public concerning the product’s safety.90 
While those who commit the (3) form of misconduct in a product liability action 
naturally deserve to be imposed on a punitive damages award, the (1) and (2) forms of 
manufacturers’ misconducts could be regarded as mere negligence.91 Distinguishing 
between the (3) form and the others is necessary because the fact of mere negligence is 
similar to that of punitive damages in product liability actions.92 There are two 
subjective elements for the imposition of punitive damages on a manufacturer: one is the 
manufacturer’s awareness of an unnecessary risk of injury culpably and another is that 
the manufacturer has to intransigently reject to take safety measures for preventing 
dangerous circumstances as well as knows the riskiness of its products.93 These 
subjective elements could be determined by several factors which determine whether “a 
flagrant indifference to the public safety” is included in the manufacturer’s awareness.94 
                                   
90 Id. at 1361. 
91 Id. at 1361–62. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1362, n.495, n.496 (explaining the meaning of the manufacturer’s awareness and of wantonness. 
The manufacturer’s awareness is that those who are generally responsible for product safety know its 
problems. For example, each member of upper management, the great majority of middle management, and 
designated management about concerned problems is regarded as the standard of the its awareness. If the 
responsibility were not related to the product safety problems, those who are more directly related to such 
matters should be responsible for them. Wantonness is defined as “a realization of the imminence of 
damage to others and a restraint from doing what is necessary to prevent the damage because of 
indifference to whether it occurs”). 
94 Id. at 1368–69. 
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According to these factors, the trier of fact could properly impose punitive damages on 
the manufacturer’s wrongdoing. Several factors include: 
(1) the existence and magnitude in the product of a danger to the public; (2) the 
cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an acceptable level; (3) the 
manufacturer’s awareness of the danger, of the magnitude of the danger, and of 
the availability of a feasible remedy; (4) the nature and duration of, and the 
reasons for, the manufacturer’s failure to act appropriately to discover or to 
reduce the danger; and (5) the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully 
created the danger.95 
A plaintiff should prove several facts for the imposition of punitive damages on a 
manufacturer in product liability actions. The plaintiff proves the fact that defective 
products lead to his or her injury that the manufacturer is aware of the defect, and that 
the manufacturer can control the feasibility of preventing the defect from threatening 
public safety by taking proper measures.96 However, the plaintiff does not necessarily 
demonstrate the manufacturer’s actual awareness of this feasibility. Since the 
manufacturer is an expert about their products and its marketing, its awareness would be 
presumed.97 Causation in fact is another requirement for the imposition of punitive 
damages on the manufacturer committing wrongdoing. There are two causation 
requirements, which are that the plaintiff’s injury is “attributable to”98 the 
                                   
95 Id. at 1369, n.529 (with these factors, the author comments that many considerations for taking a 
pertinent measurement of punitive damages award are included). 
96 Id. at 1363. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1367 (explaining that the causal correlation of the alleged its misconducts and the injury could be 
explained well by the phrase “attributable to” rather than the phrase “caused by” in order to underline that 
the U.S. court does not reject the plaintiff’s action in a product liability action including punitive damages 
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manufacturer’s defective product: the first causation in fact is whether the 
manufacturer’s defective product brings about the plaintiff’s injury and the second is 
whether causal correlation of the alleged its misconducts and the injury is a substantial 
factor in causing an accident.99 
As the standard of product liability including the U.S. doctrine of punitive 
damages has been refined and established well by courts of the U.S. and by secondary 
resources, outrageous and malicious misconducts can be regulated well by the 
doctrine.100 Due to the standard, not only do manufacturers try to maintain and to 
develop the quality of their products for public safety, but they are also likely to regard 
damages of consumers as their damages. 
 
ii. ANALYZING THE REVISED PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT OF SOUTH KOREA 
South Korean legislature adopted the doctrine of punitive damages into each 
special act.101 However, before the U.S. punitive damages were enacted into South 
Korean Product Liability Act, since its Civil Act and Product Liability Act could not fully 
regulate product liability attributable to malicious misconducts,102 adopting the U.S. 
                                   
even though the plaintiff has trouble in proving the causation in fact for the imposition of punitive damages 
under the strict common–law principles which are applied to compensatory damages). 
99 Id. at 1367–68; see MCCORMICK, supra note 113, at § 83. But see e.g., Gill v. Manuel, supra note 68, at 
802. 
100 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Motor Vehicles Products Liability Cases, 
17 A.L.R. 7th Art. 4 (2016); J. G. Wahlert, Annotation, Constitutional Issues Concerning Punitive 
Damages – Supreme Court Cases, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 529 (2005). 
101 See text at supra note 1. 
102 Jung–Soo Kwak, Why have Korean victims of humidifier disinfectant not received compensation?, 
HANKYOREH (May. 11, 2016), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/743377.html; 
Min–Jo, supra note 145; Dae–Seon Hong, How far will Volkswagen Korea’s emissions scandal go?, 
HANKYOREH (July 13, 2016), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/752206.html; 
Young–Jin Oh, Catching VW, THE KOREA TIMES (Aug. 3, 2016), 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/11/202_211062 .html. 
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punitive damages into South Korean Product Liability Act was required. For example, 
when decision–makers of a manufacturer decide for marketing its products regardless of 
defects, they can compare its benefit and compensatory damages caused by its defective 
products. If the benefit is larger than compensatory damages, decision–makers are not 
reluctant to pay compensatory damages to victims and market the defective products. 
Therefore, as the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was introduced into the revised South 
Korean Product Liability Act,103 the revised Act helps consumers to be protected by 
manufacturers’ malicious misconducts through the imposition of punitive damages. 
By revising South Korean Product Liability Act, article 3104 and adding the 
article 3–2105 into the revised Act, the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was introduced 
                                   
103 Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, since the revised Product Liability Act is 
not yet translated by Ministry of Government Legislation of South Korea, translated Product Liability Act, 
articles mentioned in infra note 104–105, 125, and 129 are referred by the prior version of the Act. 
104 Id. art. 3 (Product Liability): 
(1) A manufacturer is responsible for the person’s life, personal injury, or property loss, except 
to the loss over the product itself, which are caused by the manufacturer’s defective product.  
(2) In spite of the prior, if a manufacturer, who is aware of defective products, does not take a 
proper measure to preventing the injury or loss inflicted upon the person and causes the person 
to become severely injured by its defective products, the manufacturer shall be liable to 
compensate the injury or property damage to the extent that the amount of compensation does 
not exceed three times of inflicting the injury on person or the property loss. A court shall take 
the following matters into consideration when it determines the amount of compensation under 
this article: 
1. The degree of intention; 
2. The degree of the damage caused by the manufacturer’s defective product; 
3. Economic benefit that the manufacturer gained by supplying its defective product; 
4. The degree of the criminal penalty or the administrative disposition, if the manufacturer 
is imposed on that because of its defective products; 
5. The duration of supplying the defective product and the scale of its supplement; 
6. The manufacturer’s financial standing; 
7. The degree of the manufacturer’s effort to remedy the injury and loss caused by its 
defective product. 
(3) If the injured person cannot find the manufacturer of the defective product, those who 
market this product to the injured person for benefit are responsible for product liability. But if 
the injured person or his or her agency is notified of the manufacturer or another supplier by 
whom the defective products was sold, the supplier who benefited from marketing of the 
defective product is not liable to product liability. 
105 Id. art. 3–2 (Presumption of the Defect etc.) If the injured person proves the following matters, the 
causation that the manufacturer’s products had defects when the products were supplied and caused the 
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into the revised Act. As the National Assembly of South Korea passed the revised 
Product Liability Act in the plenary session, the main expected effects of the revised Act 
are the protection of consumers and the improvement of the quality of products made by 
South Korean manufacturers and of its competitiveness.106 With the revised South 
Korean Product Liability Act, article 3 and added 3–2, analyzing a comparison between 
the U.S. legal issue about product liability including punitive damages and the revised 
South Korean Product Liability Act helps the revised Act of South Korea to develop itself 
and to regulate malicious misconducts.  
The revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 3 states possibility of the 
imposition of punitive damages on a manufacturer who caused the injury or loss inflicted 
upon a person. When the South Korean courts assess a punitive damages award against 
the manufacturer, because of the Act, article 3, the punitive damages award would be 
restricted to the extent that the amount of compensation does not exceed three times of 
inflicting the injury on person or property loss. With the restriction of the amount of 
punitive damages within three times of compensatory damages, the legal issue is whether 
the restriction could achieve two goals, which are the optimal level of punitive damages 
and the functions of punitive damages such as punishment and deterrence. South Korean 
lawmakers might think that establishing the optimal level of punitive damages through 
                                   
injury or loss shall be presumed. But if the manufacturer proves that the injury or loss happened not 
because of its products, but because of another reason: 
1. The fact that the injury or loss happened when the product was used under normal condition; 
2. The above injury or loss was caused by the reason that the manufacturer could practically 
control in its area; 
3. The above injury or loss generally does not happen without the defective product. 
106 GONGJEONGGEORAEWIWONHOE [FAIR TRADE COMM’N], "JINGBEOLJEOK SONHAEBAESANGJE" DOIP 
DEUNG JEJOMUL CHAEGIMBEOP GAEJEONGAN GUKOE TONGGWA [INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH KOREA PASSED THE REVISED PRODUCT 
LIABILITY ACT] 2 (2017), http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportView.jsp?report_data_no=7234.  
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the restriction of the amount of punitive damages is likely to be essential for controlling 
the amount of punitive damages as well as for preventing a manufacturer from being far 
more burdensome compared with the manufacturer’s misconduct. 
For the imposition of punitive damages on the liable manufacturer in South 
Korea, a plaintiff is basically responsible for proving: (1) the product’s defect; (2) the 
injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff; and (3) the causation that the product’s defect 
lead to the injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff hardly proves these 
three factors because product liability actions are generally related to professional and 
specialized knowledge. Considering the difficulty of proving these facts by the plaintiff, 
before South Korean Product Liability Act was revised, the case law established by 
Supreme Court of South Korea allow the presumption in the product liability action.107 If 
the plaintiff proves the fact that the injury and loss happened when the product was used 
under normal condition, the courts of South Korea presume the product’ defect and the 
causation between the defect and the injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff. As the 
case law developed by Supreme Court of South Korea was enacted as the article 3–2 of 
the revised South Korean Product Liability Act, the plaintiff’s responsibility for proof can 
be relieved.  
The added article 3–2 presumes the product defect and its causation if a plaintiff 
proves: (1) the fact that the plaintiff’s injury or loss caused by the defective product under 
normal condition; (2) the fact that the aforesaid injury or loss happened under the control 
of the liable manufacturer or supplier and its area; and (3) the fact that the aforesaid 
                                   
107 See e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da16771, Mar. 12, 2004 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct], 
98Da15934, Feb. 25, 2000 (S. Kor.); Jin–Su Yune, Jejomoolchaegimui Juyo Jaengjeom – Choegeunui 
Nonuireul Jungsimeuro – [The Main Issues of the Product Liability], Beobhakyeongoo Je21Kwon Je3Ho 
[YONSEI L. REV. vol. 21 no. 3] 47–48 (2011) (S. Kor.); Cf., text, at supra note 94–97. 
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injury or loss does not happen without the defective product.108 In contrast, for balancing 
between the plaintiff and the manufacturer or suppliers, the revised South Korean Product 
Liability Act, article 3–2 allows the manufacturer or suppliers to be excused from product 
liability by proving the injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff was caused by the 
plaintiff’s intention over the defect, by the negligence, or any other reasons. 
In principle, the courts of South Korea impose compensatory or punitive damages 
on a liable manufacturer. However, if an injured person does not know the manufacturer 
causes the injury or loss inflicted upon the person, the revised South Korean Product 
Liability Act, article 3 (3) basically imposes compensatory or punitive damages on a 
supplier regardless of the supplier’s awareness of whether or not the supplier knew or 
could know the liable manufacturer.109 As the revised Act extends the scope of the 
subject who is responsible for the injury or loss, the plaintiff will be able to be protected 
firmly. 
 
B. COMPATIBILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES WITH PRODUCT LIABILITY 
i. COMPATIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
For the imposition of punitive damages in product liability cases, there are two 
legal problems. The first is whether the doctrine of punitive damages could be applied to 
the strict product liability. While the doctrine has been developed to regulate malicious 
misconducts by wrongdoers, the theory of strict liability has been established not by the 
wrongdoers’ degree of care, but by products itself. The second is related to warranty 
                                   
108 See Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3. 
109 Id. at art. 3 (3). 
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actions. As the doctrine of punitive damages could not be applied to contracts, an injured 
consumer could not be recovered by the imposition of punitive damages in a warranty 
action caused by contracts and product liability. 
 
1. PRINCIPLE OF STRICT LIABILITY OVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Extending the doctrine of punitive damages to product liability is a complicated 
issue, considering the development of the doctrine and the argument of the legal 
formulism over it.110 Since the doctrine of punitive damages has been developed for 
regulating malicious misconducts,111 there is a dispute regarding whether the doctrine of 
punitive damages could be compatible with strict liability in the field of products liability 
litigation.112 In light of the requirement of defendant’s fault, the incompatibility 
argument over the dispute seems to be reasonable because those who agree the 
incompatibility argument thought that the strict liability is determined not by the 
                                   
110 Owen, supra note 7, at 1267–68, n.41 (explaining that “the most frequently cited purported flaws in the 
doctrine” of punitive damages are that: (1) punitive damages are anomalous; (2) imposing punitive 
damages on the wrongdoer without the criminal procedural safeguards could be unconstitutional because 
they are originated from a criminal fine; (3) there is possibility that the plaintiff would benefit from a huge 
amount of punitive damages because they are not regarded as compensatory damages; (4) without specific 
standards for assessing punitive damages against the wrongdoer, there is possibility that the defendant 
should bear over assessed punitive damages award). See text at supra note 17–19 (explaining the attitude of 
the legal formulism over the doctrine of punitive damages is against assessing punitive damages award for 
regulating misconducts); see also Kagan, supra note 46, at 779–80 (introducing the opinion about the 
abolition of punitive damages, which argues that the problems are caused by the huge amount of punitive 
damages and reputing that opinion). 
111 See text at supra note 26. 
112 Compare Owen, supra note 7, at 1269–71, with Donald M. Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer’s 
Liability for Design and Punitive Damages – The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. AIR. L. & 
COM. 595, 620 (1974) (concerning whether the doctrine of punitive damages could be applied to the act 
related to mere proof that a defendant manufactures and distributes defective products because the doctrine 
of punitive damages is construed as the legal tool for regulating reprehensible misconducts), and Forrest L. 
Tozer, Punitive Damages and Product Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300, 301(1972) (asserting “[s]trict 
liability and punitive damages will not mix. In strict liability[,] the character of the defendants’ act is of no 
consequence; in the punitive damages claim the character of the act is paramount.”), and David A. 
Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 315 (1969) (arguing that 
exemplary damages cannot be allowed for mere negligence unless a specific statue permit to assess the 
damages against a wrongdoer). 
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defendant’s degree of care, but by the product and its defectiveness.113 
However, those who agree with the dispute over the compatibility point out that 
the incompatibility argument misunderstands the notion of fault in strict liability.114 The 
theory of strict liability developed the notion of fault by including the product and its 
defectiveness into the legal consequence fault regardless of the manufacture’s fault rather 
than by giving up the degree of care exercised by the manufacture.115 Another 
compatibility argument is that the incompatibility argument relies invalidly on the 
assumption that punitive damages should be awarded by the identical facts for 
compensatory damages based on the underlying theory of its liability.116 When the court 
considered imposing punitive damages on the defendant due to the trespass, the court 
decided that: “[W]hether exemplary damages should or should not be given does not 
depend on the form of action so much as upon the extent and nature of the injury done 
and the manner in which it was inflicted, whether by negligence, wantonness, or with or 
without malice.”117  
In addition to the two logical reasons mentioned above, the U.S. courts has 
thought of a punitive damages award as a cause of action based on the principles of strict 
liability in many cases such as nuisance, trespass to land and liability for ultra–hazardous 
activities, negligence per se, defamation, and implied warranty in the sale of drugs.118 
                                   
113 Owen, supra note 7, at 1268–69; Haskell, supra note 112, at 620; Tozer, supra note 112, at 301; Rice, 
supra note 112, at 315.  
114 Owen, supra note 7, at 1268–71. 
115 Id. at 1269. 
116 Id. see Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2D 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that “[a]n award of compensatory 
damages is not a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.”) 
117 Owen, supra note 7, at 1269–71; Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 219, 225–26 (1852). See Drake v. 
Wham–O Manufacturing Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (explaining that a claim for punitive 
damages is not part of the claim itself). 
118 Owen, supra note 7, at 1270–71; see Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 450–53 (1973); Milford 
v. Tidwell, 276 Ala. 110, 113–14 (1963); Lueck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 111 Ariz. 560, 570–71 (1975); 
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Considering the notion of fault in product liability and the invalid assumption established 
by the incompatibility argument, prohibiting punitive damages in product liability is 
unreasonable.119 
 
2. WARRANTY ACTIONS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
Since cases about product liability in the sale of drugs and defective products 
related to physical harms sometimes happen after buying defective products for so long, 
injured consumers cannot bring an action because of a shorter tort statute of limitations or 
procedural bar except for warranty. Even though injured consumers barely bring an 
action in warranty, they may not require punitive damages because warranty actions are 
generally derived from contracts and because the imposition of punitive damages is not 
allowed in litigation about solely contract.120 The Restatement of Contract(second) § 355 
explains that the doctrine of punitive damages is applied to a breach of contract only if 
the breach of contract is also regarded as a tort. Considering the Restatement of 
Contract(second) § 355, if a warranty action in product liability is related to a tort and an 
injured consumer proves malicious misconducts about defective products, he or she can 
argue the imposition of punitive damages even in the warranty action. 
As warranty actions in product liability litigation are generally regulated by 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2–313, § 2–314, and § 2–315, the problem is the 
interruption of Uniform Commercial Code § 1–305.121 The official comments of 
                                   
Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Fleet v. Hollenkemp, supra note 69, at 225–
26. 
119 Owen, supra note 7, at 1271. 
120 Michael Carlton Garrett, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 
613, 627 (1972). See the Restatement of contract(second) § 355. 
121 Owen, supra note 7, at 1275. 
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Uniform Commercial Code § 1–305 (a) explains that one of the propositions of § 1–305 
(a) is “to make it clear that compensatory damages are limited to compensation.” In light 
of the official comment of this subsection (a), Uniform Commercial Code § 1–305 (a) is 
likely to hinder the imposition of punitive damages for product liability. However, the § 
1–305 (a) could be interpreted such that there is the possibility of recovering punitive 
damages for breach of warranty by a specifically provided section in Uniform 
Commercial Code or by other rule of law.122 In addition to the interpretation of the 
section, as manufacturers’ activity that they maliciously ignore product safety causes 
consumers to get physical or mental damages, their activity could be regarded as a 
tortious conduct regulated by the “other rule of law”.123 
With the interpretation of the Restatement of Contract and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, even though warranty actions are derived from the contract and the 
doctrine of punitive damages could not be applied to issues about contract, the product 
liability case combined with warranty and tortious conducts could be regulated by the 
doctrine of punitive damages. 
 
ii. COMPATIBILITY IN SOUTH KOREA 
The purpose of comparative analysis between the U.S. and South Korea legal 
issue about punitive damages and their compatibility of product liability is to study the 
revised South Korean Product Liability Act. While the theory of product liability is 
established by strict liability, the doctrine of punitive damages is based on a wrongdoer’s 
                                   
122 Owen, supra note 7, at 1275–76; John A. Jr. Parkins, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Dishonor of a 
Check, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 360 (1971). 
123 Owen, supra note 7, at 1277. 
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misconduct.124 The revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 2 (2) explains the 
meaning of “defect.”125 A manufacturer’s misconduct in the article 2 (2)(a) is regarded 
as strict liability but the misconduct violating the article (2)(b) and (c) is considered as 
negligence per se.126 According to the revised South Korean Product Liability Act, 
article 2 (2)(a), if “defect in manufacturing” brings about the injury or loss inflicted upon 
the consumer, the manufacturer shall be responsible for product liability regardless of the 
manufacturer’s negligence. Therefore, the U.S. dispute over the doctrine and its 
compatibility of product liability could be applied to the revised Act of South Korea, 
article 2 (2)(a).127  
Since the theory of strict liability has been developed by extending the legal 
consequence from the degree of care exercised by the manufacturer to the product and its 
defectiveness, the doctrine of punitive damages can be theoretically introduced into the 
revised South Korean Product Liability Act. Applying the doctrine to the revised Act has 
                                   
124 See text at supra note 26, 112–113. 
125 Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, at art. 2 (2): 
(a) The term “defect in manufacturing” means the lack of safety caused by manufacturing or 
processing of any product not in conformity with the originally intended design, regardless of 
whether the manufacturer faithfully performed the duty of care and diligence with respect to the 
manufacturing or processing of the product; 
(b) The term “defect in design” means the lack of safety caused by failure of a manufacturer to 
adopt a reasonable alternative design in a situation where any damage or risk caused by the 
product would otherwise have been reduced or prevented if an alternative design had been 
adopted; 
(c) The term “defect in indication” refers to cases where damages or risks caused by a product 
could have been reduced or avoided if a manufacturer had given reasonable explanation, 
instructions, warnings or other indications on the product but he/she fails to do so. 
126 See Jong–Hyun Kim, Jejomool Gyeolhame Daehan Jejoeopjaui Mugwasilchaegim – Ipjeungchaegim 
Wanhwa Banganeul Jungsimeuro [Manufacturer’s Strict Liability Caused by Defective Products – Focus 
on a Relief of Responsibility for Proof], Beobhakyeongoo 44 [LAW. REV. vol. 44] 59, 62–63 (2011) (S. 
Kor.); Jin–Su, supra note 107 at 1, 18–41; Jong–Goo Lee 2, Jisi, Gyeonggo(pyosi)sangui Gyeolhamgwa 
Jejomoolchaegim [Instruction and Warning Defects in the Product Liability Act of Korea], Jeoseutiseu 
Je97Ho [JUSTICE L. REV no. 97] 46, 51 (2007) (S. Kor.). See also e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2002Da17333, Sept. 5, 2003 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da16771, supra note 106; Supreme 
Court [S. Ct.], 2005Da31361, Mar. 10, 2006 (S. Kor.). 
127 See text at supra note 60–61, 110–107. 
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a positive influence on protecting consumers from misconducts committed by a malicious 
manufacturer. On the contrary, product liability caused by “defect in design” of the 
revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 2 (2)(b) and “defect in indication” of 
the article 2 (2)(c) is based on the standard of care exercised by the manufacturer.128 If 
the manufacturer violates the article 2 (2)(b) and (c), the violation of these two types of 
product liability consists of negligence per se, and thus the doctrine of punitive damages 
can be theoretically compatible with the theory of product liability.  
The revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 7 is about the statute of 
limitation.129 If the statute of limitation is expired, the plaintiff cannot bring an action 
and require compensatory or punitive damages against the malicious manufacturer. Since 
the litigation about product liability such as medical malpractice generally happens after 
long periods, the plaintiff’s right of claim for damages normally depends on warranty. 
According to the U.S. legal issue and implication about the warranty action for a punitive 
damages award, the imposition of punitive damages on malicious misconducts is 
basically beyond the doctrine of punitive damages because the doctrine is for regulating 
torts rather than contracts. But if the legal issue about contracts is mingled with the torts, 
                                   
128 See Jin–Su, supra note 107, at 21–22, 34. 
129 Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, at art. 7: 
(1) The right of claim for damages under this Act shall be extinguished by the completion of 
prescription if the injured person or his/her legal representative does not exercise his/her rights 
within three years from the date on which the injured person or his/her legal representative 
becomes aware of both of the following facts: 
(a) Damages; 
(b) The person liable for the damages pursuant to Article 3 
(2) The right of claim for damages under this Act shall be exercised within 10 years from the 
date on which the manufacturer supplied the product which caused the relevant damages: 
Provided, That with respect to damages caused by any substances which are accumulated in the 
body and, in turn, hurt the relevant person’s health, or any other damages the symptoms of 
which appear after a lapse of a certain latent period, the aforesaid period shall be reckoned from 
the date on which the damage occurs actually. 
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the doctrine of punitive damages can be exceptionally applied to this issue. Considering 
the conflictual relations between the statute of limitation and the doctrine of punitive 
damages in the warranty action for product liability including a punitive damages award, 
the U.S. issue and its implication for warranty actions help the revised South Korean 
Product Liability Act to settle the conflictual relations. 
According to the revised South Korean Product Liability article 7, the statute of 
limitation will run from the plaintiff’s awareness of damages and the liable manufacturer 
including suppliers or from the date on which the manufacturer marketed the product 
causing the plaintiff’s injury or loss. The statute of limitation based on the plaintiff’s 
awareness is that his or her right of claim for compensatory or punitive damages should 
be exercised within 3 years,130 whereas another based on the date is that the plaintiff can 
exercise his or her claim for that within 10 years. In addition to two types of statute of 
limitation, the Act provides an exception about them. The exception is about personal 
damages which are caused by any accumulated substances in body or about any other 
damages that the symptoms of damages could be discovered after a lapse of a certain 
latent period.131 The statute of limitation over the exceptional conditions will run from 
the occurrence of these damages actually.132 As the Act extends the period of statute of 
limitation over the above exceptional circumstances, the injured plaintiff can bring an 
action for a punitive damages award within the extended statute of limitation. However, 
since the plaintiff’s right of claim for damages which are not included in the statute of 
limitation and exceptional conditions mentioned above should depend on the warranty, 
                                   
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
 35 
the U.S. legal issues over the doctrine of punitive damages and its compatibility of the 
theory of product liability in warranty action133 can be discussed in South Korea for the 
revised Product Liability Act. Since the cases of product liability including malicious 
misconducts in South Korea also consist of contracts and torts like the U.S. warranty 
actions,134 the U.S. legal issue and implication for the doctrine and its compatibility of 
product liability can be applied to South Korean Product Liability Act, and consequently 
consumers in South Korea will be firmly protected by the revised Product Liability Act as 
well as the U.S. legal issue and its implication of a punitive damages award in warranty 
actions.  
 
C. FUNCTIONS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO PRODUCT LIABILITY 
i. FUNCTIONS AND APPLICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Considering the definition and concept of the doctrine of punitive damages 
defined by primary and secondary materials,135 the functions of the doctrine could be 
divided into the prominent and less prominent functions.136 To specify the functions of it, 
the prominent functions are for punishing the defendant’s outrageous misconducts with 
retribution and for deterring similar misconducts in the future.137 The less prominent 
                                   
133 See text at supra note 118–120. 
134 Id. 
135 Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908; SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, 
at 572; Cheatham v. Pohle, supra note 28, at 471. Owen, supra note 7, at 1265; Corbert McClellan, supra 
note 26, at 276 (1935); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, supra note 26, at 492–93. 
136 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1277–99. But see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1318–28; Note, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 520–24. 
137 SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574; Cheatham v. Pohle, supra note 28 at 471–72; 
Owen, supra note 7, at 1277; Campbell Estates, Inc. v. Bates, 517 P.2d 515, 521 (1973); Schmidt v. Cent. 
Hardware Co., 516 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 496 P.2d 939, 945–46 (1972);  
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functions are for stimulating private persons to enforce the rules of law and for 
reimbursing the plaintiff’s excess of actual damages such as substantial legal fees.138 
 
1. PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 
One of the most prominent functions is to punish the defendant who outrageously 
or maliciously injured the plaintiff.139 As the courts impose punitive damages on the 
defendant because of the outrageous misconducts, the punishment of them leads to the 
individual satisfaction of the plaintiff, the maintenance of public peace, and the positive 
influence indirectly on the law–abider.140 Most of all, the individual satisfaction of the 
plaintiff by the imposition of punitive damages gives a pleasure of vengeance to the 
injured defendant.141 This is because one of the objectives of tort law is that the court let 
the plaintiff give up self–help through the satisfactory legal procedure and punishment.142 
Rationally, allowing the injured to give any chance of private revenge against the 
wrongdoer is hardly justified in a modern legal system.143 However, in light of the 
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plaintiff’s emotional equilibrium and the objectives of tort law,144 the function of the 
punishment and retribution brings about a positive result in the community.145  
The maintenance of public peace is preserved by the imposition of punitive 
damages.146 This means that since an injured person is satisfied with the court’s decision 
assessing punitive damages against the outrageous wrongdoer, the imposition of punitive 
damages prevents the person with doing self–help for revenge and with dueling between 
the parties, and consequently it plays an important role in inducing individual vengeance 
to the courtroom.147 Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages protects social 
moral and legal standards.148 When wrongdoers make a member of society be damaged 
with the outrageous or malicious intent, the court should decide to punish outrageous 
misconducts in order to maintain public peace and to rebuild the society’s emotional 
equilibrium.149  
The punishment of the wrongdoer who causes the plaintiff to get hurt has a 
positive influence on indirectly the law–abider.150 As the wrongdoer was punished by 
punitive damages, not only does the law–abider confidently observe social moral and 
legal standards, but he or she regards them as the fairness of the judicial system.151 In 
addition to the positive influence on the law–abider, the punishment of the wrongdoer by 
punitive damages brings about a positive result that he or she could learn and absorb 
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society’s legal value and gives him or her the chance of atoning for his or her 
misconducts.152 
The most common cause of product liability is categorized into three factors: the 
manufacturing defect, the design defect, and the warning defect by manufacturers’ minor 
misconducts.153 As each common causation is regarded as a mere error in the product 
liability action, the court does not need to consider the doctrine of punitive damages for 
punishment and retribution.154 However, if a manufacturer knowingly or recklessly 
ignores the defective product and causes consumers to get injured, the manufacturer’s 
malicious misconduct would be punished with the imposition of punitive damages. As 
the court imposes punitive damages on the manufacturer for punishing the outrageous 
misconducts, the injured consumers’ emotion of helplessness over the manufacturer’s 
malicious misconducts could be tempered with the award of punitive damages and the 
imposition of punitive damages deprives the manufacturer of their benefit produced by its 
outrageous misconducts.155 Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages on the 
manufacturer’s malicious misconducts reflects the public’s criticism and emphasizes the 
manufacturer’s responsibility toward consumers’ safety.156 
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2. DETERRENCE 
The deterrence is also regarded as one of the most important functions of punitive 
damages with punishment.157 The definition of deterrence is the process of discouraging 
a wrongdoer and members of the social community from committing misconducts by fear 
of punishment.158 With the definition of deterrence and the concept of the doctrine of 
punitive damages, the deterrence is divided into the general and specific deterrence.159 
While the specific deterrence is for preventing the wrongdoer from engaging in similar 
misconducts again in the future, the general deterrence is for prohibiting the members of 
the social community from having the similar misconducts in the future.160 
With the general deterrent effect, the U.S. courts have followed the “reasonable 
relationship” rule, which is based on the comparison between actual harm and the amount 
of punitive damages. The courts do not set up the specific formula for the proper 
deterrence under the “reasonable relationship” rule. In contrast, the theory of deterrence 
criticizes the attitude of the U.S. courts over the general deterrent effect. The theory of 
deterrence is about “the elaboration of the effect on rational actors of the possible 
imposition of sanctions for violations of law.”161 The theory explains that the proper 
deterrence could be achieved by the effort of establishing the specific formula for the 
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“reasonable relationship” rule.162 The rule and the vague standard for it bring about 
either inadequate or excessive deterrence163 because the “reasonable relationship” is 
determined by the judge’s discretion.164 In addition to the specific formula for the 
“reasonable relationship” rule, the possibility of escaping liability should be regarded as 
an important factor to achieve the effect of deterrence properly.165 The proper effect of 
the deterrence is related to the optimal level of punitive damages. Since establishing the 
optimal punitive damages depends on whether the misconducts are certainly revealed or 
not, the trier of fact separately considers the possibility of escaping liability and the 
liability with certainty when the amount of punitive damages is determined for deterring 
the misconducts.166 
In product liability actions, the prediction of the imposition of punitive damages 
on malicious misconducts is rarely possible for a manufacturer because a manufacturer 
cannot accurately predict how many consumers get injured by a defective product,167  
although there are the “reasonable relationship” rule suggested by the U.S. court and the 
theory of specific formula for proper deterrence. Due to the unpredictability of the 
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amount of punitive damages in the product liability action, the deterrent effect by 
punitive damages could be achieved by the imposition of them on manufacturers 
producing ultra–hazardous products for their benefit regardless of consumers’ injuries 
and compensatory damages for consumers’ actual damages.168 
 
3. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMPENSATION OVER ACTUAL DAMAGES 
The functions of punitive damages as law enforcement and compensation for 
excess of actual damages are relatively less important than the prominent functions such 
as punishment and deterrence. However, the less important functions also play a role as 
useful legal tools. Most of all, the function of the law enforcement has a positive 
influence on the community as punitive damages serve as “a kind of bounty” which leads 
the injured plaintiff to bring an action against the wrongdoer.169 In light of the bounty, 
the imposition of punitive damages serve as a reward “for his public service in bringing 
the wrongdoer to account,” and it contributes to the community as the trier of fact 
assesses punitive damages against the wrongdoer’s misconduct which is “beyond the 
reach of the criminal law and the public prosecutor.” 170 Another less important function 
is the compensation for excess of actual damages.171 To specify it, since the “American 
rule” does not allow attorneys to receive awards of attorneys’ fees without the statutory 
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authorization, punitive damages function as the payment of litigation expenses for the 
plaintiff.172 
 In product liability actions, the imposition of punitive damages helps injured 
consumers to pay for attorney’s fees and costs of preparing for the product liability 
action173 as well as functions as law enforcement for punishing and deterring malicious 
misconducts by a manufacturer. Compared with another type of action, the action for 
product liability requires more professional knowledge because discovering and proving 
defective parts of the product are not easy for consumers, and thus they should hire 
experts about the defective product.174 This additional expense for the product liability 
action is burdensome to the plaintiff who is an injured consumer.175 However, as the 
U.S. courts impose an award of punitive damages on the wrongdoer marketing defective 
products intentionally, the injured consumers could become less burdensome about 
paying additional money for discovery and proof of the defective parts of the product.176 
 
4. POSSIBILITY OF BLUNTING THE FUNCTIONAL EFFECTS 
The expected effects resulting from functions of the doctrine of punitive damages 
could be achieved by the imposition of punitive damages on outrageous wrongdoers in 
product liability actions. As an award of punitive damages becomes burdensome to 
manufacturers, they try to investigate their products for consumers’ safety and to find 
their defective products. However, a problem is product liability insurance about punitive 
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damages. Due to the liability insurance, there is a debate over whether the effect of the 
doctrine’s functions could decrease or not.177 The first opinion is that the liability 
insurance’s influence on product liability actions could hinder the doctrine of punitive 
damages from achieving their prime purpose in these actions.178 This means that as a 
manufacturer committing wrongdoing to consumers takes up an insurance policy for 
preserving its benefit from the imposition of punitive damages caused by its malicious 
misconducts, the functions of the doctrine could become less effective.179 On the 
contrary, another opinion criticizes the first opinion and argues that the liability insurance 
has a less negative influence on the doctrine’s functions.180 Research found that the 
insurance problem makes manufacturers work out a way, such as “risk control 
techniques,” to improve their products’ safety and quality.181 In addition to the 
improvement of safety and quality, due to deductible provisions in the liability insurance, 
manufacturers cannot help taking care of the insurance problems, if their coverage for 
liability insurance could not decrease.182 According to the study report of the U.S. 
Bureau of Domestic Commerce, since some manufacturers could not take out an 
insurance policy for product liability because of the decline of insurance partially or 
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entirely by insurers, they give up marketing risky products.183 In light of the policy of 
insurers, the functions of the doctrine of punitive damages are not undermined by the 
insurance problems about product liability actions because the insurers will decline the 
insurance for the manufacturer committing malicious wrongdoing. Therefore, the 
manufacturer should be responsible for the product liability including punitive damages 
regardless of insurance problems. 
 
ii. FUNCTIONS AND APPLICATION IN SOUTH KOREAN REVISED PRODUCT 
LIABILITY ACT 
The U.S. doctrine of punitive damages is introduced into the revised South 
Korean Product Liability Act. The reason why the revised South Korean Product 
Liability Act adopts the doctrine is directly related to functions of the doctrine of punitive 
damages.184 The doctrine of punitive damages functions as punishment, retribution, 
deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation for excess of actual damages.185 
According to the reference report released by Fair Trade Commission of South Korea, the 
main purpose of the revised Act is to deter malicious misconducts committed by a 
manufacturer.186 As the revised Act restricts an amount of a punitive damages award 
within three times of inflicting the injury or loss upon a plaintiff, the legal issue is 
whether the purpose of deterring malicious misconducts could be achieved. Within the 
purview of a limited punitive damages award, the imposition of the awards on malicious 
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misconducts could become a less effective deterrent for manufacturers or suppliers.187 
This is because the limited punitive damages are hardly distinguished with compensatory 
damages. On the contrary, the Fair Trade Commission of South Korea thinks of three 
times of inflicting upon a plaintiff’s injury or loss as a proper amount of punitive 
damages award. The Commission considers several factors for establishing the 
reasonable amount of punitive damages. First, if there is no cap for the punitive damages 
award, manufacturers’ activities shall decrease because they are reluctant to invest their 
money on developing dangerous products required to install additional safety parts.188 
Second, if a legal action for a punitive damages award causes a liable manufacturer or 
supplier to become bankruptcy because of the unlimited award, those who do not 
participate in this legal action cannot require punitive damages of the bankrupted 
manufacturer.189 Therefore, the imposition of punitive damages without the cap brings 
about the inequity issue among consumers injured by a liable manufacturer.190 Third, 
considering the relation of other special acts of South Korea to Product Liability Act, Fair 
Trade Commission of South Korea mentions that the revised South Korean Product 
Liability Act adopts the doctrine of punitive damages with the three–times’ cap. This is 
because all South Korean special acts adopting punitive damages restrict an amount of 
punitive damages award within three times of inflicting of injuries or losses upon the 
plaintiff.191 
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IV. FUTURE OF SOUTH KOREAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. NECESSITY OF IMPROVEMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A legal dispute over effectiveness of punitive damages in the Product Liability 
Act of South Korea is whether the essential purpose of protecting consumers from 
malicious manufacturers could be achieved by the imposition of punitive damages within 
three times of compensatory damages. When the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was 
introduced into the revised Product Liability Act of South Korea, lawmakers restricted a 
punitive damages award to the three times of compensatory damages.192 According to 
Fair Trade Commission, for preventing manufacturers from being bankrupted, the 
amount of punitive damages should be limited to the three–times’ cap.193 Moreover, 
without exception, the cap of all adopted punitive damages in each special act of South 
Korea is limited to three times of compensatory and thus there is possibility that those 
who get severely injured by the malicious manufacturer could not be recovered fully 
within the three times of compensatory damages.194 Because of concern about 
manufacturer’s bankruptcy without sense of responsibility and a uniform limitation about 
the imposition of punitive damages, the legal problem caused from the above legal issue 
is that effectiveness of the South Korean punitive damages could be weakened.195  
To improve effectiveness of punitive damages for guaranteeing right of 
consumers, the first method is to reform the South Korean punitive damages by 
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reviewing theoretical legal disputes over the doctrine of punitive damages in product 
liability. The second is that the manufacturer should have sense of responsibility toward 
consumers rather than concern about bankruptcy caused by the imposition of punitive 
damages. 
 
B. REFORMING THE THREE–TIMES’ CAP OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
To maintain the original purpose of punitive damages in the revised Product 
Liability Act which is for guaranteeing right of consumers, restricting the amount of 
punitive damages uniformly to the three times of compensatory damages is not proper. 
The limited amount of punitive damages adopted into several special acts of South Korea 
could not fully satisfy a consumer’s damages caused by a malicious manufacturer, if the 
consumer is severely injured or loses his or her life by the manufacturer. The courts of 
South Korea follow the enacted punitive damages within the three times’ cap and might 
impose the punitive damages award against the malicious wrongdoer within two or two 
point five times at the most.196 Even though the limited amount of punitive damages can 
prevent manufacturers from being bankrupted and cannot discourage them to invest 
money on the development of risk products, if the adopted punitive damages of South 
Korea is not effective for protecting some consumers who are severely damaged or lose 
their life, the punitive damages of South Korea may not become a practical legal tool, but 
just a symbol. 
There is an implication for reforming punitive damages in South Korea that the 
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existed cap should be increased to ten times at the most.197 However, the best way of 
guaranteeing the consumer’s right is to abolish the fixed cap of punitive damages when 
the consumer is severely injured or loses his or her life. Since South Korean 
policymakers and lawmakers considered the guideline for the imposition of punitive 
damages suggested by Supreme Court of the U.S.,198 without the cap of punitive 
damages, the courts of South Korea can decide punitive damages by the judge’s 
discretion. 
 
C. IMPROVEMENT OF MANUFACTURERS’ RESPONSIBILITY 
If manufacturers have sense of responsibility toward their products, policymakers 
do not try to establish the doctrine of punitive damages. Improving a manufacturer’s 
sense of responsibility is the best method for protecting consumers from malicious 
misconducts by manufacturers. For improving the manufacturers’ responsibility, the 
revised Act, article 3 (1) regulates that a punitive damages award will be assessed against 
all manufacturers.199 A legal issue about the article 3 (1) is whether this article shall have 
a negative influence on manufacturers’ activity because all manufacturers are affected by 
the punitive damages award.200 However, the revised Act, article (3) restricts the 
applicability of the doctrine of punitive damages within the purview of a certain 
circumstance that a manufacturer intentionally gives a rise to severely personal damages 
by its defective product, and consequently the adopted punitive damages will have less 
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negative influence on its marketing than what the manufacturer expect.201 As all 
manufacturers are regulated by the revised Product Liability Act of South Korea, not only 
will their competitiveness in the domestic and international market be raised, but also 
their awareness of public safety will be increased by complying with the Act.202 
Moreover, if a manufacturer maliciously and outrageously does not consider the 
fundamental right of a consumer and the product is marketed to the consumer without the 
manufacturer’s sense of responsibility, the courts of South Korea do not need to take the 
possibility of the manufacturer’s bankruptcy into account. If not, the purpose of punitive 
damages is never achieved and the essential right of the consumer cannot be guaranteed 
by the revised Product Liability Act of South Korea. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was finally introduced into the revised 
South Korean Product Liability Act. Before the introduction of the U.S. doctrine, 
consumers’ personal damages attributable to malicious manufacturers misconducts was 
not prevented by the prior South Korean Product Liability Act. Following the South 
Korean Civil Act, the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages cannot be allowed to regulate 
manufacturers’ misconducts. This is because the prior South Korean Product Liability 
Act had been established by the principle of the Civil Act, and thus the South Korean 
courts have imposed compensatory damages within the defendant’s responsibility for his 
or her misconducts only. Even though the introduction of the U.S. doctrine of punitive 
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damages cannot fundamentally settle the legal problem mentioned above because of 
confliction between South Korean Civil Act and the U.S. doctrine, the introduction of the 
U.S. doctrine is practically required to protect consumers from malicious manufacturers. 
Besides, the revised South Korean Product Liability Act adopts the presumption of proof 
for consumers. And if consumers cannot know a manufacturer who causes them to be 
injured by its defective product, the revised Act shall allow them to bring an action for 
punitive damages against a supplier. The revised South Korean Product Liability Act 
strongly protects consumers better than before.  
Since the cap for limiting punitive damages might hinder effectiveness of the 
punitive damages award from deterring malicious misconducts committed by a 
manufacturer, reviewing product liability cases caused by malicious misconducts is 
necessary. Moreover, a theoretical issue about conflicting the U.S. doctrine of punitive 
damages and the principle of South Korean Civil Act is not fundamentally settled. The 
introduction of the U.S. doctrine into each special act of South Korea is likely to escape 
from this theoretical issue, and thus the principle of South Korean Civil Act cannot be 
developed. Henceforth, the U.S. legal principles such as the doctrine of punitive damages 
may be continuously introduced into South Korea. Whenever the U.S. legal principles 
come into conflict with the principles of South Korean Civil Act, if the U.S. legal 
principles are not introduced into the South Korean Civil Act, but into each special act of 
South Korea, the ultimate resolution that the principles of South Korean Civil Act can 
harmonize with the U.S. legal principles is never achieved. Therefore, policymakers of 
South Korea might need to keep studying how the principles of South Korean Civil Act 
can mingle with the U.S. legal principles. 
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